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ABSTRACT
Ott (2009) identifies two kinds of philosophical theories about laws: top-down, and
bottom-up. An influential top-down reading, exemplified by Ernst Cassirer, emphasized
the ‘mere form of law’. Recent bottom-up accounts emphasize the mind-independent
natures of objects as the basis of laws of nature. Stang and Pollok in turn focus on the
transcendental idealist elements of Kant’s theory of matter, which leads to the ques-
tion: is the essence of Kantian matter that it obeys the form of law? I argue that Kant
has an independent theory of matter in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science, one that gives what Kant himself calls a “real definition” of matter as a theory-
independent (if not mind-independent) entity. I argue that this matter theory under-
pins physical arguments about inertia and impenetrability which resemble Einstein’s
arguments about the unification of fields in general relativity.
Just give me matter, and I will build you a world from it.
Immanuel Kant, Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens, 1755
Walter Ott (2009, introduction) identifies two kinds of philosophical theories
about laws: top-down, and bottom-up.1 Top-down law theorists, like Descartes, ar-
gue that the laws govern the course of nature. Even if the objects, bodies, or sub-
stances that instantiate the laws vary, the laws themselves are invariant—they are
commands. Bottom-up law theorists, like Locke, argue that the properties, natures,
or essences of objects or substances ground the laws and their reach. In the past, few
readers of Kant defended a view according to which Kant has what Ott calls a ‘bot-
tom-up’ account of the laws of nature, and of the laws of physics in particular.
An influential top-down reading by the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism, exem-
plified by Ernst Cassirer and Hermann Cohen, emphasized the “mere form of law”
and the “validity” of the a priori laws (or principles) for a given domain (see, e.g.,
Patton [2009]). The relevant dynamical properties of material substances were de-
termined by the a priori laws, not vice versa. Messina (2017) calls this and allied
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top-down views the “Derivation Account (DA).” Michael Friedman often is identi-
fied as an exponent of the Marburg reading.2
Messina (2017) and Breitenbach (forthcoming) delineate a number of bottom-up
responses to the DA, including the Necessitation Account (NA) found in work by
Watkins (2005), Kreines (2009), and Messina himself.3 On this view, the command
of a priori law is grounded in the natures of mind-independent substances and their
interactions. Thus, as Kreines (2009) notes, on the Necessitarian Account our
knowledge of the ultimate basis of Kantian laws may be limited.
It may be correct that if the natures of mind-independent objects ground the
laws, then Kant must concede that we can’t know that ground. However, much de-
pends on how we define the ‘natures’ or ‘essences’ of objects. Stang (2016) and
Pollok (2001) have emphasized the role of transcendental idealism in Kant’s argu-
ment in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (MFNS). As Stang (2016)
argues, it is the “essence” of matter to be an object of experience, on Kant’s account.
Since the MFNS lays out the essential properties of matter and of material bodies,
those properties must be of matter as an observable. Pollok (2001) argues, as well,
for a reading of the MFNS that emphasizes transcendental idealism.
In what follows, I will argue for a reading of Kant’s MFNS according to which the
laws that feature in the Dynamics, the Mechanics, and the Phenomenology are fun-
damentally bottom-up, consistent with the NA, but in the sense that they support
possible determinations of matter as it can be an object of experience. On the read-
ing that follows, the laws are valid for bodies with certain essential properties: bodies
whose concepts can be given a “real definition,” as Kant puts it in the J€asche Logik
(9:143f.).4 In the MFNS Kant lays out the fundamental properties of material bodies,
and he gives real definitions of mass, matter, material substance, and material body
in that work. Kantian laws, as necessary, universal a priori commands, do not apply
with necessity to any objects of a possible experience, independently of their consti-
tution. The necessity and universality of the laws of physics depend on the constitu-
tion and real definition of observable material bodies.5
Section 1 discusses the Marburg reading of Kant associated with Friedman and
Cassirer, and argues that that reading should not go so far as to suggest that Kant’s
metaphysics of nature is limited to deriving the a priori consequences of the mere
form of law. Section 2 takes up this question, arguing that Kant’s metaphysical argu-
ments about material bodies, the fundamental forces with which they are endowed,
and the forces of interaction between them go beyond his project in the Critique of
Pure Reason of describing properties of objects as they can be perceived. Instead,
Kant defends an account of the essential properties of material bodies, and gives a
physical argument about the forces with which such bodies can be endowed. Section
3 demonstrates that such an account reinforces Kant’s claims that the laws of nature
apply universally to material bodies. Such a theory of matter can support Kant’s
claims that extension and impenetrability are fundamental properties of matter, but
that inertia is not.
One might argue that the Kantian reasoning I’ve described as ‘physical’ consists
merely of a priori or counterfactual claims: if material bodies were to have certain
properties, then we could draw certain conclusions about forces of, or interactions
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between, material bodies. Section 4 takes up the question of whether Kant’s argu-
ments in the MFNS are genuinely physical arguments. Appealing to recent scholar-
ship by Dennis Lehmkuhl on Einstein’s theory of general relativity, the section
begins with Einstein’s arguments for the unification of inertia and gravity in general
relativity. One could argue that Einstein’s arguments are counterfactual as well: if we
assume a certain structure in GR (the geodesic equation), then one can draw certain
conclusions about the unity of inertial and gravitational forces. But Einstein’s reason-
ing is robustly physical: it is about the physical consequences of our acceptance of a
theory. It is about how we decide about which fundamental forces exist, or do not ex-
ist, based on the simplest expression of a background formal theory.6 Mutatis mutan-
dis, Kant’s theory of matter in the MFNS takes this form. Thus, I conclude that we
can attribute a genuine matter theory to Kant, a theory with recognizable physical
consequences.
1 . THE DERIVATION ACCOUNT OF THE LAWS OF PHYSICS
In Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, Ernst Cassirer traces a discussion of the laws of me-
chanics in Newton and Euler, who thought that the laws of mechanics were universal
and necessary, and that the certainty of those laws has implications for our commit-
ments about bodies. In the meantime, Cassirer points out, the “mechanical” world-
view was replaced by the “electro-dynamical” one, and the implications of the laws of
mechanics for the metaphysics of body came to seem increasingly local (Cassirer
1953, 353). In response, as Cassirer goes on to argue, “above all it is the general
form of natural law which we have to recognize as the real invariant and thus as the
real logical framework of nature in general” (Cassirer 1953, 375). Cassirer sees him-
self as inspired by Kant in isolating the “form of natural law” from local conditions.
On the Marburg reading, often identified with Cassirer and with Michael
Friedman, the ‘form’ of the laws of nature is required to establish the ontological
consequences of those laws within the system of nature. The laws can have ontologi-
cal or physical consequences, but those consequences must be local. Nonetheless, we
can argue that the fundamental properties of matter, including the dynamical rela-
tionships into which material bodies can enter, may depend constitutively on the
kind of law-governed properties we must ascribe to matter a priori. For instance, we
are able to make certain categorical determinations of matter a priori to support the
revised version of Newton’s “deduction” of the law of gravitation “from the phenom-
ena” that Kant provides in the fourth, “Phenomenology” chapter of the MFNS. On
Friedman’s reading, this chapter explains
how attributions of motion and rest to matter can be successively determined
under the modal categories of possibility, actuality, and necessity—thereby re-
sulting in a distinction between “true” and merely “apparent” motion. Kant . . .
here develops a reconstruction of Newton’s “deduction from the phenomena”
of the law of universal gravitation in Book 3 of the Principia. (Friedman 2014,
535)
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Friedman identifies three steps in this deduction, paraphrased below:
1. The observable phenomena are Kant’s starting point: “the moon relative to
the earth, the moons of Jupiter and Saturn relative to the planets in ques-
tion, and the planets relative to the sun.” These are “merely relative mo-
tions,” which are at this stage only possible (Friedman 2014, 535).
2. Next, using the law of inertia, Kant derives centripetal, inverse-square accel-
erations of satellites towards their primary bodies (e.g., “the moon towards
the earth”). These “true . . . orbital rotations . . . now count as actual”
(Friedman 2014, 536).
3. Finally, Kant shows that these accelerations are “proportional to the quanti-
ties of matter of the corresponding primary bodies” and that they are “also
everywhere mutual between any two gravitationally interacting bodies.”
This allows Kant to argue, on the basis of the law of the equality of action
and reaction, that any two gravitationally interacting bodies accelerate in
opposite directions and “in inverse proportion to their masses” (Friedman
2014, 536).
The three stages of the deduction from the phenomena correspond to the Postulates
of Empirical Thought: possibility, actuality, and necessity. Friedman concludes that
“In thus determining all the relevant motions in question as first possible, then actual,
and finally necessary we have, by the same argument, also established the law of uni-
versal gravitation.” Moreover,
since each of these mutual accelerations has just been determined as necessary in ac-
cordance with the Postulates of Empirical Thought, the law of universal gravita-
tion has itself been determined as necessary in the same sense—relative, that
is, to the initial Keplerian Phenomena from which we began.” (Friedman 2014,
536, emphasis added)
Friedman’s reading relativizes the Kantian a priori to the Keplerian phenomena: the
laws are necessary to determining the observed motions as necessary. But to which
aspects of those phenomena are the laws relative? To the apparent motions of the
bodies? Or to the essential qualities of the bodies in motion? Or to both?
One way of reading the procedure outlined here rests on a classic top-down account
of Kantian laws. We begin with observable phenomena, but end by ‘determining all the
relevant motions’ a priori. That determination is independent of the physical properties of
any given set of material bodies, and applies to bodies in general. We isolate the mutual
accelerations, speeds, changes of the state of motion that the observed phenomena exem-
plify, and then determine these motions ‘as necessary in accordance with the Postulates
of Empirical Thought’, which are themselves pure and general rules for the synthesis of
representations. Thus, we can prove that the laws are universal, precisely because we can
prove that they are necessary. That any possible bodies whatsoever must move in the
way prescribed follows from the generality of the proof.
A number of objections can be made to a purely deductivist account of the
MFNS. It cannot be the case that from a pure determination of motion alone, for
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Kant, we establish a universal law a priori about the motion of objects. As Kant’s infa-
mous footnote makes clear, there can be no pure, a priori science of the motion and
movability of objects:
Motion of an object in space does not belong in a pure science and thus not in
geometry. For, that something is movable cannot be cognized a priori but only
through experience. But motion, as the describing of a space, is a pure act of
synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general through the productive
imagination and it belongs not only to geometry, but even to transcendental
philosophy. (B155n)
It could be replied that the deduction from the phenomena shows that the laws of
‘motion, as the describing of a space’ govern the motion of objects in space. But this
is unlikely to be the case, for Kant, without the essential basis of an account of sub-
stance as the movable in space, provided in the Dynamics section of the MFNS. The
experience and especially the quantitative determination of motion, for Kant, always
requires a self-subsisting substance that underlies that motion. Otherwise, how are
we to establish that the quantity of motion we attribute to the object is not an arte-
fact of the subject’s motion with respect to the object, or with respect to other ob-
jects? Kant is preoccupied with precisely this question in the Phoronomy and
Dynamics sections of the MFNS.
The Marburg reading can be criticized on the grounds that it appears to begin
with the phenomena, and move to a bony level of abstraction, in which motion is de-
tached from bodies to form a dynamical exoskeleton. The laws of nature then are at-
tributed to possible motions, considered in isolation from the bodies or the matter
that is in motion. The universal necessity of the laws of nature is then derived from
the fact that the necessity of the law of gravitation, for instance, does not depend on
any property of bodies, only on the quantitative, dynamical relationships determined
by the mutual motions of the bodies in question, considered in abstraction from the
bodies themselves and from the matter that constitutes them. On such a top-down
reading, Kant’s laws of motion govern the behavior of matter, and thus of material
objects. The ‘Keplerian phenomena’ can be read as spatiotemporally distributed
properties, and the mechanical or dynamical relations that vary proportionally to the dis-
tribution of matter do not depend on any particular such distribution. This is a possible
account of why Kantian laws of nature are universal and necessary. It is also the sense in
which the laws describe ‘transcendental’ relationships.
But such an account would not explain why Kant’s four chapters in the MFNS
give successively more precise definitions of matter and of material substances.
Moreover, it would not explain why Kant appears to think that his Dynamics chap-
ter, for instance, can support an account of the fundamental forces that it is legiti-
mate to ascribe to material bodies.
2 . TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM AND REAL DEFINITION
One response to such criticisms might be to argue that matter, in the MFNS, is de-
fined by its observability. Stang argues that part of the real essence of matter is given,
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for Kant, by its being an object of a possible experience (Stang 2016, §8.3). The “cru-
cial claim” of transcendental idealism is that “the a priori conditions of a possible ex-
perience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of
experience” (A111). In §7.3, Stang argues that “conformity to the forms of experi-
ence is part of what makes [any possible object of experience] x a possible object of
experience,” and thus “being an object of possible experience, and hence conforming
to the forms of experience, is part of the essence of matter” (Stang 2016, 252f.).
Stang emphasizes that matter is an object of possible experience, and thus that its
essence is determined not just by the laws to which it is subject, but by the condi-
tions for conformity to the “forms of experience” (Stang 2016, 253). On this reading,
the laws of material bodies are the laws of observable bodies. The transcendental ide-
alist reading thus can address the objections to the Derivation Account cited above.
The advantages of a transcendental idealist reading of Kant should need little ex-
planation. However, a reading that emphasizes the transcendental idealist elements
of the definition of matter in the MFNS, without further elaboration, risks falling into
a trap. We might argue that “being an object of possible experience, and hence con-
forming to the forms of experience, is part of the essence of matter,” and then that
physical bodies are material bodies (Stang 2016, 253). Or we might say, as Hyder
glosses Pollok’s (2001) view, that attractive and repulsive forces in the Dynamics
chapter are “necessary categorical determinations of the empirical concept of matter
just because they are prerequisites for matter’s being a possible percept” (Hyder
2003, 421).
It seems a small step to say that the esse of matter is percipi. The old criticism of
Kant, that he is a Berkeleian idealist despite his best intentions, seems a possible con-
sequence of reading the MFNS in this way. If the fundamental forces in the
Dynamics chapter, the gravitational force in the Phenomenology chapter, and the
like are all determinations of matter only as something that can be perceived, then
Kant would need to give a further argument to show that the forces in the Dynamics
and the Phenomenology are physical forces attributable to material bodies.
That pitfall is removed, however, if we construct a deliberately bottom-up reading
of Kant’s MFNS. To do so, we can say even more about what Kant sees as the es-
sence of matter. The categories and the principles are the laws of the understanding,
the rules that determine the form of the course of experience. But the categories are
also the rules for determining the properties of substances (see, e.g., Friedman 2004,
xx–xxi; MFNS 4:551). In the context of the MFNS, Kant gives an account of what
properties material substances and bodies must have to support the laws of
mechanics.
In particular, Kant appeals to the “real definitions” of material bodies7 as a basis
for his arguments that impenetrability and extension are fundamental properties of
matter, but that inertia is not.8 In the final sections of the J€asche Logik, Kant identifies
“real definitions” as those that give characteristics (“Merkmale”) that define the real
essences of things, in Kant’s own sense—a list of properties that, if an object were to
lose any one of them, that object would cease to be what it is (9:143).
Here, we can return to the final stage of the deduction from the phenomena. In
that stage, we must be able to determine that “the accelerations [of the satellites] in
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question are directly proportional to the quantities of matter of the corresponding
primary bodies . . . and that such accelerations are also everywhere mutual between
any two gravitationally interacting bodies” (Friedman 2014, 536). It may seem that
this requires only that we determine the absolute quantities of matter and of mutual
acceleration, since we are showing that acceleration is proportional to the quantity of
matter. But note that this proportion is shown to be well defined with respect to
“the quantities of matter of the corresponding primary bodies” and that the accelera-
tions are shown to be “mutual between any two gravitationally interacting bodies”
(ibid.).
To be able to determine these proportions, note what, by Kant’s own lights, we
must be able to do:
1. Determine that two bodies actually are moving, and accelerating, with re-
spect to each other, which requires distinguishing true from apparent mo-
tions, and motion from acceleration.
2. Determine the quantities of matter of any two bodies on a scale that allows
us to compare those quantities to each other and to ascribe them to the
bodies (on an objective scale).
3. Show that, for any two ‘gravitationally interacting bodies’, we can measure
their mutual acceleration, and it will have the proportions defined in (1)
and (2).
It is integral to the deduction from the phenomena that we show that mutual acceler-
ation is essential to determining two bodies as gravitationally interacting. We must be
able to show that if two bodies are not accelerating with respect to each other in a
way that is proportional to their mass, those bodies are not interacting gravitation-
ally. This is a real definition, founded on a law of interaction. But that real definition
is not based only on a pure, a priori law. It is based also on our ability to determine
the quantitative properties of the ‘primary bodies’ that are being defined as interact-
ing. Only with a first-order definition of those properties can we formulate the laws
as Kant does in the MFNS.
It is possible to find a univocal value for the mutual acceleration of any bodies
proportional to their quantities of matter, as is done in Newton’s Principia and in
turn in the MFNS. For Kant, this possibility is based on our ability to determine the
quantity of matter and of motion for any two bodies. That, in turn, requires that the
concepts of matter and motion be part of the real definition of bodies with respect to
the system of nature. If the quantity of matter of a body cannot be univocally estab-
lished, and if the true motions of that body cannot be described with respect to other
material bodies, then it is not a ‘material body’ in the sense necessary to construct a
system of nature.
Systematic knowledge (Wissenschaft) is “a whole of knowledge as a system and
not as an aggregate” (J€asche Logik, 9:139). This, in turn, requires real definitions of
the elements of the system of knowledge, as Kant goes on to say in the Logik. Only if
we can define the essential qualities of material bodies (perhaps including movability,
impenetrability, and extension) can we construct a system on the basis of the laws of
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interaction of material bodies that can be observed. The laws are not laws of motion
generally, but rather of the motions (Phoronomy chapter), forces (Dynamics chap-
ter), and interactions (Mechanics chapter) of material bodies.
3 . REAL ESSENCES AND LAWS OF NATURE
Kantian laws of mechanics and of dynamics are universal because they apply to all
material bodies, and the essence of these bodies can be defined, as in the MFNS. In
the context of the MFNS, a “body” is a material substance with a certain form
(4:537). The Phenomenology chapter requires the groundwork of the first three
chapters, in which Kant provides a conceptual framework for describing the essential
properties of matter and of material bodies when determining the laws of nature in
the context of natural philosophy, including laws of gravitation, cohesion, and elastic-
ity of bodies. For these laws to be determined as necessary a priori relative to the
phenomena, matter must be endowed with a fundamental force of repulsion, and
with fundamental properties of impenetrability and extension, as I explain in the sec-
tion following. This type of universality is not absolute, but relative to the essential
qualities of material bodies, to the conditions for the possible experience of those
bodies, and to the necessity of the essential qualities listed to the deduction from the
phenomena provided in the Phenomenology.
Is there reason to believe Kant held to this type of universality? There is a clear
precedent, namely Newton’s Rule III for reasoning in philosophy, in the Principia:
“Those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and remitted and that belong to all
bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken as qualities of all bodies univer-
sally” (Newton 2014/1687, 795). The key difference, of course, is that Kant’s ac-
count of the ‘real essences’ of bodies cannot be based on observation and
experiment. But we can define the ‘real essence’ of matter and of material bodies a
priori. And, in so doing, we can derive the laws that material bodies must obey to be
objects of a possible experience, and we can also determine the properties they must
have in order to be a part of a system of nature.
The step in Kant’s argument that may be forgotten is the appeal, inspired by
Euler, to the metaphysical properties of bodies.9 Kant does not think that the laws of
physics govern independently of the properties of material bodies. The laws of phys-
ics are universal and necessary because they are derived from the principles of possi-
ble experience and knowledge of material bodies. However, Kant does not ground
his essentialism in a commitment to empirical natural kinds. ‘Body’, ‘substance’, and
the like can be given real definitions precisely because they are not empirical con-
cepts, and are not derived from the phenomena. Rather, we construct a definition of
what a body must be in order to play its role in the system of natural science.
As we know from the Critique, for a substance to be an object of possible experi-
ence, our representations of it must be synthesized not only according to the catego-
ries of relation, but also according to the categories of quantity and quality.
According to the Principles, this in turn means that our observations (intuitions) of
these bodies must be extensive magnitudes composed successively in time, and must
be intensive magnitudes that possess a degree. In the MFNS, all these are desiderata
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on what counts as a ‘material substance’ or ‘body’ that can take its place as part of
the system of natural science.
Kant’s account of the laws of nature has been read as a rejection of Newton’s and
Euler’s view that the laws are founded in the metaphysics of body. But what proper-
ties of body and of matter must be asserted to derive the a priori relationships in
Kant’s deduction from the phenomena? Kant maintained that establishing a system
of nature requires determining the real essences of the system’s elements. In the
MFNS, giving real definitions of matter, material substance, and material body is nec-
essary to deducing the laws of nature. There, Kant argues for impenetrability and ex-
tension as fundamental properties of matter, and that inertia is not a fundamental
property, which supports a bottom-up reading of Kant on the laws of nature.
Stan (2013) criticizes the “Marburg reading” of Kant, exemplified by Friedman’s
work, on the ground that Kant is motivated not by the desire to “derive Newton’s
laws,” but by deeper problems in the Leibnizian tradition. I agree that we must look
beyond Newton to find the motivation for Kant’s arguments in the MFNS.10 A much
earlier attempt to do that is found in Timerding’s “Kant und Euler,” which details
problems in mechanics in the Leibniz-Wolff tradition, on the one hand, and the
Cartesian tradition, on the other; their reception by Euler and Baumgarten; and the
influence of the latter on Kant.
Another source for the structure of Kant’s account in the MFNS is Euler’s
“Recherches sur l’origine des forces.”11 As DiSalle notes, “it is well known” that Kant
“regarded Euler’s critique of Leibnizian metaphysics, and his defense of Newtonian
space and time, as a crucial influence on his own developing conceptions, not only of
space and time in particular, but of the relation between physics and metaphysics in
general” (DiSalle 2013, 454). Kant admired elements of Euler’s work12 “Re´flexions
sur l’espace et le temps,” in which Euler writes that the basic laws of mechanics “ab-
solutely must be founded in the nature of body; and since it is metaphysics that con-
cerns itself with the nature and properties of bodies, the knowledge of these truths
can serve as a guide to its thorny researches” (Euler 1748, 324–25, trans. DiSalle
2013, 454).
Nonetheless, Harman is skeptical of the claim that Kant was influenced by Euler’s
work, arguing that “Kant does not . . . accept the Newton-Euler doctrine that ‘inertia’
and ‘impenetrability’ were ‘essential’ properties of matter” (Harman 1983, 240).13
Harman is correct that Kant did not argue for inertia as a fundamental property of
matter. As Kant puts it, to use the word “inertia” to describe matter means “nothing
other than its lifelessness as matter in itself . . . all matter in itself is lifeless. The law
of inertia says that and nothing else” (MFNS 4:544).14
But Kant does argue for impenetrability as a fundamental property of matter, ex-
plicitly, and at some length. In the MFNS, in the “Erkl€arungen” of the laws of me-
chanics and of dynamics, Kant defines matter, material substance, mass, and body:
Material substance is that in space, which is movable for itself, that is, distin-
guished from all others that exist outside it in space. The movement of a part
of matter, through which it ceases to be a part, is separation. Separation of the
parts of matter is physical division. (MFNS 4:502f.)
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The quantity of matter is the amount of the movable in a particular space. The
same, insofar as all its parts in its motion can be regarded as active (moving) si-
multaneously, is called mass, and one says, a matter acts in mass, if all its parts
move in the same direction, without exercising its moving force at the same
time. A mass of a particular form is called a body (in the mechanical sense).
(MFNS 4:537)
These characteristics constitute real definitions of matter and of material substance. In
the J€asche Logik, Kant talks of “Sach-Erkl€arungen oder Real-Definitionen” (9:143).
These are those explanations or definitions “that suffice for knowledge of the object,
of its internal determinations, insofar as they explain the possibility of the object from
its internal characteristics [Merkmale].” The real definition of matter itself is effected
through the four “Erkl€arungen” provided for the four sections, the metaphysical foun-
dations of phoronomy (kinematics), dynamics, mechanics, and phenomenology:
Phoronomy. “Matter is the movable in space.” (MFNS 4:480)
Dynamics. “Matter is the movable, insofar as it fills a space. To fill a space
means to resist any movable, which attempts to penetrate a certain space through its
movement. A space that is not filled is an empty space.” (MFNS 4:496, empha-
sis added)
Mechanics. “Matter is the movable, insofar as it has motive force in itself.”
(MFNS 4:536)
Phenomenology. “Matter is the movable, insofar as it as such can be an object
of experience.” (MFNS 4:554)
Matter is movable, impenetrable, has motive force proper to itself, and can be the ob-
ject of experience. This is not a list of accidental properties of matter: the ‘is’ here is
a collective ‘is’ of identity, not of predication. Matter just is that which is movable,
impenetrable, has motive force proper to itself, and can be the object of experience.
Anything that has these qualities is matter; anything that fails to have any one of
them, is not.
Kant’s second law of dynamics has it that “Matter fills its spaces through repulsive
forces of all its parts, i.e. through a force of extension proper to it, that has a specific
degree” (MFNS 4:499). In a remark on this law, Kant says “Impenetrability as a fun-
damental property [Grundeigenschaft] of matter, through which it first manifests itself
to our senses as something real in space, is nothing but the power of extension of
matter (Lehrsatz 2)” (MFNS 4:508). Impenetrability and extension, for Kant as for
Newton and Euler, are fundamental properties of matter.15
In my view, a reading of the MFNS according to which the work gives the “foun-
dations” of science but no scientific argument is mistaken. Among Kant’s arguments
in the MFNS are physical arguments, not only about the laws of nature, but also
about certain fundamental forces we can ascribe to matter.
4. KANT AND PHYSICAL REASONING
On a bottom-up reading, the arguments in the Dynamics, in the Mechanics, and in
the Phenomenology constitute a real definition of matter, material substance, and
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material body. Moreover, Kant’s real definition of matter, and his ascription of funda-
mental forces to matter, is not merely a conceptual foundation for natural science. It
supports real results of natural science, in the sense that we can read Kant as laying
out actual physical arguments in the MFNS.
Kant rejects the arguments given by Newton, Euler, Wolff, and others that matter
is endowed with a fundamental force of inertia (Stan 2013, §2; Harman 1983). Kant
argues, instead, that matter is entirely passive—lifeless—and that this is the only
sense in which we can ascribe “inertia” as a fundamental or essential property of mat-
ter. This is, however, only a negative quality—the absence of a force—and so it is not
part of the real essence of matter. In the MFNS, Kant dispenses with the postulate of
an inertial force, and uses only extension, impenetrability, movability and the other
listed properties as the fundamental properties of matter.
Kant’s argument bears some resemblance to Einstein’s argument about the unifi-
cation of inertia and gravity in general relativity (GR). According to recent research
by Lehmkuhl, Einstein himself saw the structural relationships of general relativity as
having consequences for his account of inertia and of gravity. Einstein “saw the geo-
desic equation as manifesting the unification of inertia and gravity in GR”
(Lehmkuhl 2014, 317). Lehmkuhl shows that Einstein thought of this unification as
similar to the unification of electric and magnetic fields in special relativity
(Lehmkuhl 2014, 323). In writings cited by Lehmkuhl on the development of the
theory of relativity, Einstein concludes, “the existence of the electric field is a relative
one, depending on the state of motion of the coordinate system used; only the elec-
tric and magnetic field together can be attributed a kind of objective reality”
(Einstein 2002/1920, 265).
As Lehmkuhl continues, “a result of this unification” of gravity and inertia in GR
“is that the existence of gravitational fields (in contrast to gravitational-inertial fields)
becomes coordinate-dependent” (Lehmkuhl 2014, 323). Just as electric fields be-
come coordinate-dependent in SR, while the electro-magnetic field is “objectively”
real, in GR gravitational fields are coordinate-dependent, and gravitational-inertial
fields are objectively real. In fact, the unification appears even more profound in GR
(Lehmkuhl 2014, 325).
Einstein argues that the geodesic equation applies to gravitational fields, but that
such fields need be posited only when comparing general relativity to special relativ-
ity, or to the Newtonian theory. Really, the equation requires the existence of only
one field, the gravitational-inertial field. Einstein appeals to the geodesic equation in
the unification of gravitational and inertial fields, just as the principle of relativity
(that the laws of electrodynamics and optics hold in all reference frames) is the
source of the mixing of electric and magnetic fields. Einstein’s argument depends on
the use of the geodesic equation, or of the principle of relativity, to argue that a
particular theoretical postulate is unnecessary. In the case of SR, it is the coordinate-
independent existence of the electric field; in the case of GR, it is the coordinate-
independent existence of the gravitational field.
Einstein argues that GR does not require the independent existence of a gravita-
tional field. Kant argues that his laws of mechanics do not require that matter be en-
dowed with an inertial force. Thus, a possible (neo-)Kantian reading of general
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relativity would appeal to Euler’s assertion that the laws of physics are “absolutely”
founded on the nature of the bodies (or fields) that they describe. In practice, Kant
adds to Euler’s assertion that, if a particular property or quality of matter, bodies, or
fields, such as inertia, is not part of the definition of those bodies as described by me-
chanics, then we need not include that force in our accounting of the constitution of
bodies or of the laws of nature themselves.
A thoroughgoing reading of the theory of relativity, according to this Kantian es-
sentialist view, would establish the “real definitions” of the gravitational, inertial, elec-
tric, and magnetic fields relative to the laws of physics, thus expanding Kant’s theory
of material bodies and their interactions into a theory of the ontological interpreta-
tion of the relativistic equations, founded in the properties we must ascribe to the
fields in order to give them a real definition.
5 . CONCLUDING REMARKS
The view of Cassirer that Kant focuses on the mere ‘form of law’ in the MFNS has
been eroded away recently. A more robust landscape of Kantian natural science in-
cludes an account, from the Necessitarian camp, of the ‘natures’ of bodies as the
foundation for the laws of nature.
That account, as Kreines (2009) notes, makes the laws of nature unknowable.
The transcendental idealist reading of Stang and Pollok repairs this lack, but at the
risk of making Kant indiscernible from a Berkeleian idealist, who argues that the es-
sence of matter is to be perceived.
Kant himself has a clear account of the ‘essence’ of matter, namely, his ‘real defini-
tion’ of matter, material substance, and material body in the MFNS. That definition
is given in the four chapters of the MFNS. In the final three chapters, Kant provides
a theory of matter that is the basis of physical arguments, including arguments
against inertia and for impenetrability as fundamental forces of matter. These argu-
ments are strikingly similar to Einstein’s arguments about the consequences of the
relativistic equations in GR for the unification of inertia and gravity. Thus, we are
forced to say either that Kant has real physical arguments in MFNS, or that
Einstein’s reasoning about fields in GR is not a real physical argument.
If Kant’s matter theory is the basis for real physical consequences, then the hazard
of the transcendental idealist reading—that it slides into Berkeleian idealism—is
avoided. But this result is achieved only by giving a more substantial account of mat-
ter than just that it is subject to the laws of nature or the principles of determination
of substances in general, as would be a consequence of the top-down view. Instead,
we must give an independent theory of matter and of material bodies. Such a theory
is not limited to constitution of material substances in accord with the ‘form of law’,
but rather, must ascribe to matter a number of independent properties. In that sense,
Kant’s theory in the MFNS is essentialist.16
NOTES
1. Massimi (2014) also uses this way of speaking.
2. I find the question of how to classify Friedman’s view somewhat more complex, though I examine his ac-
count critically below.
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3. Massimi (2017) also defends an account of laws in Kant that retrieves nomological necessity. She argues
for a broadly dispositional essentialist account of Kant’s view; and spells out the modal resources avail-
able to Kant for retrieving nomological necessity in terms of ‘grounds’.
4. References to Kant’s works are to the volume and page numbers of the Akademie edition (Kant
1900ff.). Translations are my own. An exception is the Critique of Pure Reason to which I refer by
citing the original pagination of the A (1781) and B (1787) edition, respectively. Translations are
from Kant (1999).
5. Although ‘matter’ is an empirical concept, it can be given a real definition, according to Kant. Matter is
special in this sense: it is one of the few empirical concepts, if not the only one, that can be given a
real definition a priori. This may be one reason why Kant famously is skeptical about the possibility of
a mathematical foundation for chemistry and biology—their empirical concepts are not definable a
priori.
6. Relative, of course, to the observed phenomena. But as Friedman has emphasized, Kant’s account in the
Phenomenology is equally relative to the observed phenomena (see Section 1, below).
7. These are not quite Lockean real essences, as Walter Ott has emphasized to me, but are related.
8. In addition to Friedman’s focus on Newton, recent scholarship has emphasized the importance of Locke
(Stang 2016; Dunlop 2009; Carson 2006; Longuenesse 1998) and Leibniz (Stan 2013; DiSalle 2013) to
Kant’s account of the laws of nature. Locke argued that the possible relations of bodies are founded in
their essences, which are the properties objects must have in order to be what they are. The real essence
of a body is the set of essential properties of an object, relative to our abstract ideas of that object. Locke
writes, “Essence, even in this sense [i.e., real essence], relates to a Sort and supposes a Species,” where a
species is an abstract idea (Locke 1975/1689, III.vi.6:443). Essences, for Locke, are dependent on the
mind and on ideas: “essential, and not essential, relate only to our abstract Ideas, and the name annexed to
them” (III.vi.4:441). I am grateful to Walter Ott for guidance on Locke’s view here.
9. Though I cannot follow it up here, Kant’s discussion of the ‘metaphysical’ as opposed to the ‘geometrical’
properties of space is relevant (see, e.g., Patton [2011], especially the references to further work there).
10. It is doubtful that Friedman thinks Kant’s only motivation in the Mechanik and Ph€anomenologie is to de-
rive Newton’s three laws of motion.
11. “The leading perspectives of this text are the derivation of certain short-range forces from impenetrability
as a basic property of all matter and the reduction of all forces in nature to such short-range forces. On
this basis, all natural events appear to be grounded on three elementary principles, extension, inertia, and
impenetrability” (Timerding 1919, 27–28)
12. See, for instance, Allison (2015, 44 and passim).
13. “In the MFNS he conceives ‘inertia’ as a law of mechanics which implied the passivity of matter, not as
an ‘essential’ or defining property of material substance” (Harman 1983, 240).
14. A significant conclusion in Kant’s investigation into the distinction between mind and matter (see
Laywine 1993, ch. 2). Stan (2013, §3) provides plausible evidence for reading Kant’s rejection of inertia
as an active force not as a rejection of Newton, but as a rejection of “the Leibnizian consensus” and of
Wolff’s account of inertia in particular.
15. Massimi gives a detailed and nuanced picture of the development of Kant’s dynamical theory of matter
as endowed with fundamental attractive and repulsive forces in the Physical Monadology (Massimi 2011,
526), traces its development in the Universal Natural History (Massimi 2011, §2), and explains clearly to
what extent Kant’s view are a departure from Newton’s theory (Massimi 2011, §2.2, §3).
16. I am grateful above all to Michela Massimi and Angela Breitenbach for suggesting that I contribute to
this issue of The Monist, and for perceptive and illuminating critique of earlier versions. Walter Ott’s reac-
tions and suggestions have resulted in material improvements. Colin McLear sent a draft, “Motion and
the Affection Argument,” which illuminated a number of questions on Kant’s theory of matter which
illuminated a number of questions on Kant’s theory of matter (McLear, forthcoming).
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